Choosing a VPN isn’t just about speed—it’s about trust. In this deep dive I pit IVPN, Mullvad, and Proton VPN head‑to‑head, unpacking their privacy audits, real‑world legal tests, DNS handling, payment anonymity, and feature perks, while explaining how the WireGuard protocol underpins them all. Read on to see which service best fits your threat model—and why the smallest signup detail can be your biggest privacy win.
Where a VPN does help on a GrapheneOS (or any Android) handset
| Scenario | What the VPN actually gives you | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|
| Public / untrusted networks (coffee‑shop Wi‑Fi, hotel, campus, airplane) | Creates an encrypted tunnel from the phone to the VPN exit node, so the hotspot owner, other Wi‑Fi clients, and the upstream ISP can’t read or tamper with your traffic | Protects against passive snooping, malicious captive portals, and “evil‑twin” APs |
| Carrier or ISP data harvesting | Hides the destination IPs, DNS queries, and unencrypted payload from your mobile provider—‑all they see is a single VPN endpoint | Limits profiling of the sites/services you use, even when you switch between cellular and Wi‑Fi |
| Geo‑fencing & censorship | Lets you appear to be in (or outside of) a given country, bypassing regional blocks, throttling, or filtering | Useful for travel, streaming, or working from regimes with heavy internet controls |
| Consistent egress IP & DNS | GrapheneOS routes all traffic (and, after the initial handshake, all DNS) through the VPN interface, giving every app the same exit point | Avoids leaks/fingerprinting from per‑network DNS and makes per‑profile traffic easier to monitor or log on your own server (GrapheneOS) |
| Selective ad / tracker blocking | Some providers (e.g. Mullvad with its “ad‑block DNS” or RethinkDNS) merge filtering into the tunnel | System‑wide blocking with no root, and without handing a second app “fake‑VPN” privileges |
Where a VPN doesn’t (or only partly) help
- Cell‑tower/IMSI tracking: The radio still authenticates with your carrier; they always know your rough location and that you are talking to one VPN IP.
- App & web‑site log‑ins: Facebook, your bank, or any service you sign into still knows it’s you. A VPN changes the return address, not your identity.
- Fingerprinting: Unique traffic patterns, device fingerprinting via TLS, or non‑standard DNS servers can still single you out.
- Full anonymity: For serious anonymity or to hide who you are from the exit node itself, Tor (or I2P) is the stronger—but slower—option.
Best‑practice tips on GrapheneOS
- Use an app‑based VPN (WireGuard or the Mullvad app are the officially tested choices) rather than the built‑in IPSec profiles. GrapheneOS
- Enable “Always‑on VPN” and “Block connections without VPN.” That gives you a kill‑switch so nothing leaks if the tunnel drops. GrapheneOS
- Skip Private DNS while tunneled. GrapheneOS warns that mixing a separate DNS‑over‑TLS resolver with a VPN causes odd leaks and adds a fingerprint; let the VPN supply DNS instead. GrapheneOS
- Trust, but verify. Because all of your traffic now flows through one company, pick a provider with a strong no‑logs stance, public audits, and open‑source clients.
- Battery & performance: Modern WireGuard tunnels are light, but any VPN can add latency and drain; keep an eye on battery stats for the first few days.
Quick takeaway
A VPN on your GrapheneOS phone is most valuable for network‑layer privacy—shielding your traffic from local observers, carriers, and basic censorship—while giving you a single, controllable exit IP. It is not a magic anonymity cloak, and you trade one set of network operators for another (your VPN provider). Use it when those trade‑offs fit your threat model, pair it with the always‑on kill‑switch, and remember that app permissions, good browser hygiene, and occasional Tor use are still part of a complete privacy diet.
Below is a side‑by‑side look at IVPN, Mullvad, Proton VPN, and WireGuard (the protocol that all three services now default to). I lead with a quick snapshot table and then dig into the meat: privacy stance, real‑world legal tests, DNS handling, feature set, and who each option is best for.
| 🛡️ Provider / Protocol | Home base & ownership | Default protocols / apps | Privacy position & audits | Notable law‑enforcement moments | Extras worth noting |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IVPN | Gibraltar‑registered IVPN Ltd., employee‑owned | WireGuard & OpenVPN in fully open‑source clients | No‑logs, annual Cure53 audits of infrastructure (2020) and apps (2021 & 2022) (IVPN) | Transparency report shows zero data ever produced (2025: 2 requests, 0 data) (IVPN) | Multi‑hop routing, “Firewall” kill‑switch, Anti‑Tracker DNS with optional Hardcore Mode (blocks all Google & Meta domains) (IVPN) |
| Mullvad | Sweden, owned by Amagicom AB | WireGuard & OpenVPN (apps + config generator) | No‑logs; repeated Cure53 audits incl. full relay infra (2024) (cure53.de) | 18 Apr 2023 Swedish police raid left empty‑handed because nothing is logged (Mullvad VPN, Mullvad VPN) | Generates random 16‑digit account numbers (no e‑mail), accepts cash, Bitcoin, Monero (Mullvad VPN); ad/tracker‑blocking DNS (100.64.0.1‑.3) (Mullvad VPN) |
| Proton VPN | Proton AG, Geneva, Switzerland (same parent as Proton Mail) | WireGuard, OpenVPN, IKEv2, plus “Stealth” obfuscation | No‑logs policy independently audited (Securitum, 2023) & warrant‑canary | 2023 – 2025: every Swiss‑court order (60 ➝ 2023; 53 ➝ 2024; 11 ➝ 2025‑Q1) denied because no connection logs exist (Proton VPN); Proton Mail did have to IP‑log one user in 2021 (Privacy Affairs) | Secure Core double‑hop via hardened servers in CH/SE/IS (Proton VPN); NetShield DNS filter (ads/malware/trackers) (Proton VPN); generous free tier |
| WireGuard (protocol) | Created by Jason Donenfeld; built into Linux, Android, BSD, Windows | N/A (kernel + userspace “wg” tools) | ~4 kLOC of modern code, easy to audit; multiple third‑party reviews (e.g. 2024 security write‑up) (Medium) | — protocol itself keeps no logs; logging depends on the VPN provider | Lightning‑fast handshakes, roaming support, ChaCha20/Poly1305 crypto; now default in Android 12+ and most VPN apps |
1 – Privacy doctrine, audits & canaries
- IVPN and Mullvad publish annual Cure53 audit reports and maintain both a transparency report and a cryptographically‑signed warrant canary. Mullvad’s “nothing to seize” moment in 2023 is the most concrete proof of its no‑logs stance. Mullvad VPN Mullvad VPN
- Proton VPN’s transparency log (updated Apr 22 2025) lists every legal order received; all were denied because Swiss law doesn’t compel connection logs and none are kept. Proton VPN The 2021 ProtonMail case is often cited online, but it involved the mail service, not the VPN. Privacy Affairs
- WireGuard itself is just a tunnel; if a provider does log, WireGuard won’t stop them. Its draw is the tiny codebase and modern cryptography. Medium
2 – Handling of DNS & content blocking
| Provider | Default DNS path | Ad / tracker blocking | Custom DNS? |
|---|---|---|---|
| IVPN | Queries exit inside the tunnel and resolve on IVPN servers | Anti‑Tracker (standard) or Hardcore (also blocks whole Google/Meta ASNs) (IVPN) | Yes – any DoH/DoT or plain resolver |
| Mullvad | 100.64.0.x block‑list resolvers on every server | Three block levels (ads, trackers, both) (Mullvad VPN) | Yes; or run “Encrypted DNS” DoH/DoT on 194.242.2.2 |
| Proton VPN | DNS travels through the tunnel to Proton servers | NetShield three‑tier filter; toggle in app (Proton VPN) | Linux & desktop apps allow third‑party resolvers (NetShield must be off) (Proton VPN) |
3 – Feature disparities
- Multi‑hop / double‑VPN:
- IVPN → user‑selectable entry & exit hops (Pro plan) IVPN
- Mullvad → “Bridge mode” (proxy or VPN ➜ VPN) for censorship evasion; WireGuard multihop on roadmap Mullvad VPN
- Proton VPN → Secure Core (fixed first hop in CH/SE/IS) included in paid plans Proton VPN
- Port‑forwarding: native in IVPN & Mullvad (useful for self‑hosting / torrents); Proton VPN purposely disallows it on privacy grounds.
- Obfuscation: Proton’s “Stealth” protocol; Mullvad supports Shadowsocks bridges; IVPN offers a separate obfsproxy guide.
- Platform openness: all three keep clients open‑source; Mullvad and IVPN also publish server‑side Ansible/Terraform code.
4 – Payment & account‑creation nuance
- Mullvad: 5 €/mo flat rate; pay by cash in an envelope, Bitcoin/BCH, Monero, PayPal, card, bank wire, Swish, etc. No e‑mail needed—just a 16‑digit token. Mullvad VPN
- IVPN: tiered plan ($2‑10/mo); accepts Monero & Bitcoin via self‑hosted BTCPay, cash vouchers, PayPal, cards. IVPN
- Proton VPN: free tier (limited servers) + paid (from ≈$4.49/mo). Takes card, PayPal, Bitcoin (but no Monero yet) and cash by mail (no refunds on cash/bank). Proton VPN
5 – So which one fits which threat‑model?
| If you want… | Lean toward… | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Maximum anonymity with minimal signup friction | Mullvad | Cash/Monero + random account number; proven “nothing to seize” raid |
| Granular tracker blocking & choose‑your‑own multihop | IVPN (Pro) | Anti‑Tracker Hardcore + entry/exit selection; extremely transparent legal stats |
| A polished ecosystem, free starter tier, or Swiss jurisdiction | Proton VPN | Secure Core & NetShield inside sleek apps; open‑source; integrates with Proton Mail/Drive |
| DIY server or self‑hosted lab | WireGuard protocol | Dead‑simple config, routes in kernel; run your own on VPS or router and combine with a privacy‑focused DNS |
TL;DR
All three services have a credible no‑logs posture, multiple audits, and “always‑on” kill‑switches. Their biggest split is in on‑device features and signup philosophy rather than raw security: Mullvad is spartan and cash‑friendly, IVPN layers on privacy tools, and Proton VPN bundles extra goodies (plus a free plan) but lives under stricter Swiss reporting laws.
Pick based on the combination of jurisdiction you trust, payment style you need, and value‑add features you’ll actually use.
